Security and privacy

Card 125

Security and privacy
Card 125
Topic 10 · Security and privacy · Navigator

How can you reduce the risk of sending bitcoin to a tampered address?

Card answer

Correct answer

Answer D: Check the address carefully on a trusted display before signing.

Quick explanation

Malware can replace a copied address with an attacker's address. Before sending, check the exact address you are actually authorizing.

Detailed explanation

Bitcoin addresses are long, so users often copy and paste them. Clipboard malware can replace a copied destination or other payment data with an attacker's details. Malware can alter data before copying, during pasting or within a manipulated wallet interface.

In address poisoning, an attacker creates similar-looking entries in transaction history. Comparing only an address's beginning and end or reusing a previous history entry is therefore weak protection. A QR code does not prevent manipulation if it comes from a tampered invoice, website or app.

The computer screen is not an independent check if that same device may be compromised. With a hardware wallet or separate signer, the complete recipient details shown there are authoritative. Check before signing or final approval. Do not sign if unexpected differences appear.

A test transaction can reduce the initially exposed amount but does not replace checking the following payment again. If a discrepancy is found, the device, wallet and download source should be examined as potentially compromised. Do not enter the seed phrase for a supposed repair on the same potentially affected device.

Example or everyday application

Someone copies a Bitcoin address from an invoice. A different address appears when pasted. They detect the mismatch on the signing device's display, do not sign and then treat the computer as potentially compromised.

Common misconception

Misconception: if the QR code or pasted address looks correct, payment must be safe. Correction: what matters is the actual signed recipient data on a trusted display. QR codes, clipboard, history and screen content can originate from a manipulated source.

Sources used

Primary source · EN · Beginner-friendly

Securing your wallet

HTTPS: YESChecked: 21.09.2026REACHABLE
Check original source
Supplementary source · EN · Technical source

Bitcoin Core - External signer and address display

HTTPS: YESChecked: 19.09.2026REACHABLE

This source is mainly intended for developers. The relevant information may therefore be harder to find.

Check original source